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The case of US companies in Switzerland 
 
Margrit Müller, University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Zurich 
[marmu@hist.unizh.ch] 
 
 
In January 2006, the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce in Zurich published a 
study on the economic impact of foreign firms in Switzerland1; the results, based on a 
survey of 100 leading firms, are quite impressive. According to this investigation 
foreign companies employ a total of 210,000 employees. With 56,000 employees, the 
US firms rank second after the German firms with 72,000 employees2. Other direct 
benefits estimated are investments, tax revenues and the positive impact on 
Switzerland’s trade balance. Furthermore, foreign companies also provide strong 
indirect quantitative and qualitative benefits for the Swiss economy: the total 
contribution of foreign companies to GDP in 2003 is estimated at 8.2 per cent. 
It seems to be the first investigation on foreign firms, and the main objective is to 
prove that they are vital for the Swiss economy and that the myth of foreign 
companies being in Switzerland just for tax saving reasons and essentially being a 
free rider in our economy but contributing marginally is quite wrong. Given that 
European countries have intensified their race for foreign direct investments 
considerably in the last two decades, the main objective of this study, namely to 
justify the presence of foreign firms, is rather surprising3. Until quite recently inward 
FDI (IFDI) have been neither perceived nor appreciated in Switzerland. Although there 
are more than 6,500 foreign firms in this country, little information is available about 
these companies.  
 
In the next section the main theoretical arguments will be outlined, followed by a 
quantitative overview on US direct investments and US companies in Switzerland. To 
some extent, the results are compared with those in other European countries and 
with the investments of Swiss companies in the US. In the fourth section, a few case 
studies about US companies will allow to analyse more closely the reasons for their 
entry, expansion or retreat from the host economy. Analysing foreign investments in 
Switzerland in a long-term perspective should lead to new insights into the 
relationship between location-specific and corporation-specific endowments and how 
this relationship changed in the course of the twentieth century4. 
 
1. Direct investments and the international competitiveness of firms and 
nations  
                                                
1 The Forgotten Sector. Foreign Companies in Switzerland. Joint Study of the Swiss-
American Chamber of Commerce and The Boston Consulting Group, Zurich, January 2006, 
pp. 10-16. 
2 According to new data published by the Swiss National Bank, in 2005 the total number of 
persons employed by foreign firms in Switzerland was 324,000. The US companies emploied 
52,800 and the German companies 82,400 persons. Schweizerische Nationalbank, 
Entwicklung der Direktinvestitionen 2005, Auslandvermögen der Schweiz 2005, Zurich, 
December 2006. 
3 See for example the articles in Lars Oxelheim & Pervez N. Ghauri (et alii eds.), European 
Union and the Race for Foreign Direct Investment in Europe, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2004. 
4 This chapter is part of the research project “Switzerland as home and host country of foreign 
direct investments and multinational enterprises: changing competitive advantages during 
the 20th century”, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. Claudia Bischof-Biotti, 
Anita Dobler and Manuel Hiestand have collected the data presented in this paper. 
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The international competitiveness of Switzerland has usually been related with the 
number and growth of the nation’s large multinational enterprises (MNEs) and 
therefore with outward foreign direct investments (OFDI). It has been assumed that in 
order to succeed abroad these firms had some competitive advantage compared with 
the firms in the host countries and that the true source of these advantages is their 
home environment: “… national values, culture, economic structures, institutions and 
history contribute to competitive success”5. OFDI were interpreted as a consequence 
of the competitive strength both of the firms and of the nation6: The fact that total 
OFDI stocks were much higher than inward foreign direct investments (IFDI) stocks – 
according to the data published by the Swiss National Bank (SNB) since 1985 – was 
no phenomenon to worry about, and the interest in the activities of foreign firms 
remained marginal. The focus was on Switzerland figuring among those countries 
with the highest direct investments abroad. 
 
The theoretical argument establishing a causal link between the international 
competitiveness of the firms and the competitiveness of their home country has 
clearly lost its persuasiveness. OFDI may well be a sign for location-specific 
disadvantages of the home base compared with foreign locations. Apparently this 
reverse relationship was lost sight of during the decades of high growth after WW2, 
but in the protectionist period between the two World Wars it was widely understood 
in Switzerland. At that time, the main reasons for outward investments were location-
specific disadvantages at home, such as higher production costs, high exchange rates 
or trade barriers raised in the main foreign markets. And while the firms perceived 
OFDI as the only means to assure their survival and maintain their market shares in 
foreign countries, workers and their unions accused them to destroy jobs at home, 
transfer valuable know-how to foreign countries and weaken the competitiveness of 
the national economy7. There are a few examples of local governments promoting IFDI 
in order to create employment opportunities during the Great Depression of the 
1930s (see section 4 below), but the domestic firms and the local authorities usually 
opposed the entry of foreign firms, because they increased competitive pressure in an 
already very narrow domestic market. 
 
The intensification of international economic integration in the last two decades has 
once more thoroughly changed the comparative advantages of nations as locations for 
MNEs. The large Swiss multinationals re-allocated their business worldwide and ever 
more firms of medium and even small size expanded their activities abroad in order 
to participate themselves in the location-specific advantages of foreign countries. 
Gradually perceptions have changed and it has been acknowledged that the 
                                                
5 Michel Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations”, Harvard Business Review, March-
April 1990, p. 74. 
6 See the investigations of John Dunning on the impact of the growth of US-owned affiliates 
on the development of European countries. An overview is given in John Cantwell, 
“Innovation and Technological Competitiveness”, in Peter J. Buckley and Marc Casson (eds.), 
Multinational Enterprises in the World Economy, Essays in Honour of John Dunning, 
Hants, England and Brookfield USA, Edward Elgar, 1992, pp. 21-40. 
7 Similar ambiguous attitudes towards OFDI have been mentioned in Mira Wilkins, The 
Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970, 
Cambridge, Mass., and London, England, Harvard University Press, second printing 1975, 
pp. 52 f. Investments were favoured in raw materials, in order to break monopolies, and in 
less developed areas (Latin America and China), while investments in advanced economies 
able to compete with US firms were not to be encouraged by US government. 
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competitiveness of a nation is no longer assured by a considerable number of ‘global 
champions’, but rather by maintaining and creating location-specific endowments 
allowing to keep a share of the activities of the domestic multinationals within the 
country and attract foreign direct investments8.  
 
Firms will expand their activities to a specific foreign country, if the foreign location 
offers some advantage compared with the home country and with other foreign 
locations, for example a large market, valuable resources or low factor costs. Highly 
competitive domestic industries and services can also be considered as location-
specific endowments. A foreign firm may want to be active in the same location in 
order to enhance its own competitiveness. In order to exploit successfully location-
specific advantages of the host country the foreign firm has to dispose of ownership-
specific advantages compared with domestic firms. Such advantages are not stable 
but will be strengthened or weakened by the activities of the foreign firms themselves, 
other developments in the host country or in competing locations.  
 
We shall distinguish between two categories of foreign investments: 
 Investments in sectors where the foreign companies have a clear competitive 
advantage: competition of domestic firms will be weak or non-existent, and the role 
of the foreign firms is to compensate for the lack of domestic activities. Their impact 
on the host economy may be considerable. 
 Investments in sectors dominated by strong and internationally competitive 
domestic firms: foreign affiliates will play a minor role and have little impact on the 
activities of domestic firms and the host economy.  
The functions undertaken by the foreign firms – manufacturing, sales, 
administration, research and development – are also important indicators for 
location-specific advantages or disadvantages. Other aspects too may lead to further 
insights into the relationship between the foreign companies and their host 
environment:  the modes of entry and exit, the duration of stay and the preferred 
location in the host country. Further more, we have to take into account that 
subsidiaries located in a specific country may be able to draw on the resources of 
neighbouring countries. This particular advantage was certainly important in the case 
of Switzerland, a country situated in the midst of Europe and participating in three of 
the main language areas. Since the early 1990s, barriers for the cross-border 
exchange of goods, services and capital within the European Union have been 
lowered considerably, but as a non-member state Switzerland did not fully participate 
in the process of integration. Being, to some extent, excluded may have influenced its 
attractiveness for IFDI. 
 
2. Quantitative analyses of US direct investments in Switzerland 
 
According to the official statistics of the Swiss National Bank available since 1993 the 
United States have been one of the preferred destination for direct investments of 
Swiss firms, besides the Netherlands, Germany and France. In all these countries, 
except in the Netherlands, the average stock of outward investments was higher than 
                                                
8 See Cantwell, “Innovation”, p. 37. The follow-up study of the publication of the Swiss-
American Chamber of Commerce mentioned in endnote 2 focuses on domestic and foreign 
MNEs in Switzerland and highlights their joint importance for the Swiss economy: 
Multinational Companies on the Move: How Switzerland Will Win the Battle!, A Joint Study 
of the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce and the Boston Consulting Group, Zurich, 
2007. 
  
4 
 
of inward investments. Investments of Swiss firms in the United States more than 
doubled the investments of US firms in Switzerland up until 1998. Then IFDI 
increased more quickly and equalled OFDI in 2003. The data available from US 
statistics cover a much longer period and convey a somewhat different picture: US 
direct investments in Switzerland9 have been higher then Swiss direct investments in 
the USA from 1966 up until 1996. The reasons for this deviation between the two 
datasets are not completely clear. The difference between the OFDI figures can largely 
be explained with currency fluctuations, while in the case of the IFDI figures it must be 
due to different databases. In the following we shall rely on the US statistics because - 
besides covering a longer period of time – they allow to place the US investments in 
Switzerland into a comparative perspective. With regard to the period before 1966 
there are some estimates of the amount of US direct investments in Switzerland for 
the period 1950-1965 and for a few years between 1929 and 1950. These figures show 
a continuous increase from a very low level. Investments kept increasing until 1993 
and took up again in 1998. 
 
 [Figure 1 near here]  
 
The proportion of Switzerland in total US direct investments fluctuated between 4 
per cent and 6 per cent, with peaks in 1984 (7 per cent) and 2004 (5 per cent) and a 
marked downturn from 6 per cent in 1992 to less then 4 per cent10 in 1999. The 
cyclical pattern is more pronounced in Switzerland’s share in total US direct 
investments in Europe, which fluctuated between 16 per cent in 1984 and 6 per cent 
in 1999, with peaks in 1984 (16 per cent) and 2004 (about 10 per cent). From 1977 to 
1993 Switzerland was constantly in the third or fourth position (after the UK and 
Germany and before or after France). The shares of the next ranking European 
countries (Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands) were considerably lower. Between 
1993 and 1999 the share of Switzerland declined from over 11 per cent to about 6 per 
cent.  In 2003, Switzerland was still in the third position (after the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands) but the US direct investments in the Netherlands were almost 
twice as high and other small European countries with considerably lower positions 
in the 1990s (especially Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden) were catching up. Major 
changes in the comparative advantages of Switzerland as location for US companies 
must have occurred in the 1990s. It seems plausible to assume that not having joined 
the European Economic Area in 1992 weakened the attractiveness of Switzerland in 
comparison with other small European countries. 
 
[Figure 2 near here] 
 
3. US companies in Switzerland  
 
For this survey, we rely on two different sources: the period 1901-1975 is covered by 
data on the foreign subsidiaries of the 180 largest US multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
of the manufacturing sector. Not covered by this database are firms of the service 
sector. In this respect we can only rely on some literature and on information 
obtained on the basis of the source used for the period 1976-2003, namely a list of US 
companies with subsidiaries in Switzerland contained in the Yearbooks edited by the 
Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce since 1976. Besides indicating the names of 
                                                
9 According to the SNB data the proportion OFDI/IFDI is 2,0 in 1993, 2,8 in 1997 and reaches 
1,0 in 2003. SNB, Statistisches Monatsheft, 11/2006, p. 2a. The US BEA figures are: 0.65 in 
1993, 1.24 in 1997 and 1,33 in  2003. 
10 US Bureau of Economic Analysis BEA, http://www.bea.gov/. 
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the US parent companies and their subsidiaries, further information is available on 
the size, the location and the activities of these firms in Switzerland.  
 
A. US companies during an early period: 1901-1975 
 
Measured at specific benchmark years, the number of US companies and of their 
subsidiaries in Switzerland increased throughout the period (Table 1). There was no 
decline during the interwar period, not even during the depression of the 1930s, as is 
often assumed in the literature. In the period from 1901-1975, about 15 per cent 
stayed between one and four years, a third between five and ten years and almost 50 
per cent more than ten years. Of the six US subsidiaries listed in 1901, four were still 
present in Switzerland at the end of the period. Most companies were newly formed. 
The number of mergers and break-ups of older subsidiaries was low throughout the 
period, the number of acquired companies increased markedly in 1967 and 1975. The 
number of firms liquidated was extremely small, but increased considerably between 
1967 and 1975. Most subsidiaries were either fully owned by the parent company or 
the parent had a majority holding.  
 
Table 1: Largest US multinational enterprises in Switzerland 
 1901 1919 1929 1939 1953 1967 1975 
Number of parent companies 3 6 11 18 29 121 129 
Number of subsidiaries 6 12 22 29 39 267 337 
Ownership: 100% 3 8 15 21 28 222 283 
  ≥50 % 3 3 3 2 5 23 32 
  <50% 0 1 3 3 2 6 7 
  no information 0 0 1 3 4 16 15 
Entry mode:  newly formed 4 9 17 20 26 159 187 
 acquired 1 2 2 3 5 58 108 
 merger or break up 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 
 no information 0 0 2 5 7 45 37 
Exit mode:  sold 0 0 0 0 0 3 28 
 liquidated 0 0 2 3 10 22 63 
 no information 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 
Distribution of subsidiaries by industry 
20:  Food and kindred products 0.0% 0.0% 4.5% 3.4% 2.6% 11.6% 9.8% 
28:  Chemicals and allied products 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 10.3% 21.7% 26.1% 
29:  Petroleum refining and related 
 industries 66.7% 58.3% 50.0% 41.4% 28.2% 8.6% 7.1% 
33:  Primary metal industries 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 6.4% 6.5% 
34:  Fabricated metal products, except 
 machinery and transportation 
 equipment 
0.0% 16.7% 13.6% 13.8% 10.3% 6.4% 5.6% 
35:  Industrial and commercial 
 machinery  and computer equipment 33.3% 16.7% 18.2% 17.2% 17.9% 11.6% 12.8% 
36:  Electronic and other electrical 
 equipment and components, except 
 computer equipment 
0.0% 0.0% 4.5% 10.3% 7.7% 13.9% 10.4% 
37:  Transportation equipment 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 2.6% 6.0% 6.5% 
38:  Measuring, analyzing, and 
 controlling instruments; 
 photographic, medical and optical 
 goods; watches and clocks 
0.0% 8.3% 9.1% 3.4% 5.1% 3.4% 4.2% 
39:  Miscellaneous manufacturing 
 industries and other industries 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 7.7% 10.5% 11.0% 
Source: Harvard Business School Database, USEMY (for data modifications see Table 2). 
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The distribution by industry reveals that before WW2, US companies in Switzerland 
were engaged mainly in four industries: petroleum, fabricated metal products, 
industrial and commercial machinery, electrical equipment and components. From 
the 1950s onwards the share of firms in the petroleum industries, in fabricated metal 
products and industrial and commercial machinery declined while the share of US 
companies in other industries, especially chemicals, food and transportation 
equipment increased. We do no know what functions the subsidiaries fulfilled, except 
for some case studies presented in section 4 below, but we assume that most 
subsidiaries were engaged in sales and services and not in manufacturing, because for 
the interwar period, Mira Wilkins mentions only direct investments of US firms in 
Switzerland in the electrical industry, but not in the other industries. Furthermore 
Wilkins mentions subsidiaries of US companies in the service sector, which are not 
included in the database used for Table 1: The National City Bank and American 
Express established branch offices. Some holding firms were located in Switzerland 
due to tax advantages (for example Coty Inc. set up a Swiss holding company in 1929, 
which consolidated its European interests) 11. There were also some minority 
participations in Swiss firms: Western Electric had a minority interest in a telephone 
and cable company with a plant in Berne, and General Electrics a minority interest in 
Brown Boveri, which was liquidated in 1953. In the case of BBC, the Swiss firm 
perceived the investment of General Electrics as a threat, and measures were 
undertaken to limit the influence of the American firm12: this was a typical reaction 
with regard to foreign firms acquiring substantial shareholdings in Swiss firms during 
the interwar period. On the one hand, preserving the national ownership of the firm 
had become important during WW1, when Swiss firms had to prove their ‘nationality’ 
in order to protect their foreign direct investments from confiscation13. On the other, 
Swiss firms feared that foreign firms might exploit their technical know-how and that 
they would lose their main competitive advantage. 
 
In the Netherlands, US subsidiary companies invested in the electrical, in the food & 
beverage and in the petroleum industry. In Belgium, factories of Standard Oil of New 
Jersey and Jersey Standards are mentioned as well as a factory of Western Electrics.  
In Norway, US firms invested in refineries (Jersey Standard), in the paper and pulp 
industry (Alcoa, Union Carbide) and in the production of carbide (Union Carbide). In 
Sweden they invested in a high power radio station (Radio Corporation of America) 
and in the production of matches (Diamond Match Company)14. Apart from direct 
investments in the electrical, the petroleum and the car industry as well as in 
business machines (later computers), where US firms had a pronounced competitive 
advantage, US firms also invested in those branches with highly competitive firms in 
the host country, the machine and chemical industries and the service sector in 
Switzerland, the food & beverage and the electrical industries in the Netherlands, the 
paper and pulp industry in Norway, the production of matches in Sweden. 
In Table 2, the number of US MNEs and their subsidiaries in Switzerland are compared 
with those in other small European countries. With regard to the number of US parent 
                                                
11 Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise, pp. 79, 136, 139.  
12 Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise, p. 295. See also Sibylle Veigl, “Heute 
ist eben gar nichts mehr sicher”. Das Unternehmen BBC Brown Boveri & Cie. Von 1927 bis 
1938, unpublished thesis, Philosophical Faculty of the University of Zurich, 2000, pp. 38-42. 
13 Martin Lüpold, Schutz vor wirtschaftlicher Überfremdung oder Abwehr unfreundlicher 
Übernahmen, unpublished thesis, Philosophical Faculty of the University of Zurich (2004), 
pp. 54 ff. 
14 Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise, pp. 7, 8, 63, 70, 85, 93, 112, 129, 130, 
139, 153, 295. 
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companies and subsidiaries, the position of Switzerland is comparable to that of the 
Netherlands, but in the years 1929, 1939 and 1953 the number is lower and in 1967 
somewhat higher. The continuous expansion throughout the interwar period and the 
rapid expansion from 1953 onwards are confirmed for all the countries.  
 
Table 2: Largest US MNE in small European countries 
Switzerland Netherlands Belgium Sweden Norway 
  MNE's Sub's MNE's Sub's MNE's Sub's MNE's Sub's MNE's Sub's 
1901 3 6 3 6 7 8 1 3 3 4 
1919 6 12 6 9 14 18 3 9 4 7 
1929 11 22 21 28 24 30 13 18 10 14 
1939 18 29 32 42 40 50 19 34 14 22 
1953 29 39 40 57 50 65 25 46 16 26 
1967 121 266 107 230 121 214 78 136 38 69 
1975 129 336 128 348 140 351 104 210 56 97 
Source: Harvard Business School Database, USEMY15. 
 
 
 
B. US investment during the period 1976-2003 
 
According to the Yearbooks of the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, the 
number of US companies present in Switzerland has been surprisingly constant, 
fluctuating around 600 since the late 1970s (figure 3)16. This number is considerably 
higher than the figures resulting from the database for the earlier period, because the 
Yearbooks include all and not only the largest US MNEs of the manufacturing sector. 
In comparison, the number of Swiss firms with subsidiaries in the United States is 
lower up until 1988, subsequently it is about the same; the total number of employees 
is considerably higher already at the beginning of the period17. This is a rather 
puzzling result, because it implies that the invested capital per employee of US 
companies in Switzerland is considerably higher than that invested by Swiss firms in 
the USA.  
 
 [Figure 3 near here] 
 
If we compare the entry and exit movements of US companies with that of the earlier 
period the rate of fluctuation increased considerably: Almost half the companies 
stayed only between one and four years, over a fifth were present between five and 
                                                
15 In this database a few subsidiaries without entry year have been cancelled, and the 
subsidiaries without exit year (most of them entering in the 1950s and 1960s) were assumed 
to be still present at the end of the period in their respective host countries. The total number 
of subsidiaries may therefore be somewhat underestimated at the beginning and 
overestimated at the end of the period. 
16 Defined as companies in which American undertakings or individuals have a substantial 
financial interest or are affiliated with an American company. Firms operating under a 
license or on a commission basis with an American firm and non-commercially oriented 
enterprises are not included. Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, Yearbook, Zurich, 
1997/08, p. 173. The numbers for the years 1977, 1979, 1981 and 1988 were calculated as an 
average of the previous and following years. 
17 SNB figures are available since 2003: in that year the US companies employed about 52,800 
persons or 17,5 per cent of the total number of employees of foreign companies. With 67,000 
the number published by the Swiss-American Chamber of commerce is considerably higher 
than that of the SNB.  
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ten years and almost a third more than ten years. A total of 107 American firms 
(about 18 per cent of all firms) were present in Switzerland throughout the period 
1976-2004; almost a quarter of these long-lived firms were founded before 1950 and 
about half until 1960. Firms founded before the 1920s were Exxon Mobil Corporation 
(1908), Eastman Kodak Company (1918), Bulova Watch Company Inc. (1912), NCR 
Corporation (1918); other important early foundations were IBM in 1927, American 
Express Company in 1921, Sperry Corporation in 1925, ITT in 1935; General Motors 
established an assembly hall in Switzerland in 1935.  
The distribution by industry and the location of US companies within Switzerland has 
been analysed at two benchmark years: 1980 and 200018. By far the preferred 
location to settle into has been the Canton of Zurich, followed by Geneva and, with a 
much lower number of companies, Zug and Vaud. Clearly, US companies have 
preferred to settle in the urban centres of the German and the French part of 
Switzerland. The distribution by industry shows that US companies were concentrated 
in the branches: chemicals, IT and computers, wholesale trade, finance and insurance, 
scientific services, administration and consulting19. In all these industries – except in 
finance and insurance and chemicals – the number of companies increased 
considerably during the twenty years period. The strong decline in the chemical 
industry must have been due to mergers and acquisitions, because the number of 
employees increased (see section 4 below).  
 
The distribution by industry of the number of US companies is confirmed by the 
distribution of direct investments (Table 3); the figures for the year 2000 are only 
partly comparable with the earlier period, but they reveal an interesting point: the 
high US investments in the category ‘finance, insurance and real estate’ must have 
been mainly due to ‘real estate’. As we shall see in section 4 below, the investments of 
US companies in the financial sector are not very important compared with the 
investments of other countries. 
. 
Table 3: US direct Investment positions in Switzerland by industry (at historical cost, 
million US $) 
  Manufacturing 
 
Finance, 
insurance, 
real estate 
Banking Wholesale 
trade 
Other 
industries 
Total  
1980 8% 26% 5% 52% 9% 100% 
1990 5% 53% 6% 31% 6% 100% 
1996 12% 45% 7% 25% 11% 100% 
2000 6% (1)  8% 9% 16% 61% 100% 
Note (1): excl. real estate 
Source: Yearbook, Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, 1993/94, 1997/98, 2004/05. 
 
According to these figures Switzerland has been an attractive market for sales and 
service activities of US firms, but not for manufacturing. US firms in Switzerland 
invested only a small fraction in manufacturing, while Swiss firms in the US invested 
mainly in the manufacturing sector (about 60 per cent in 1980 and still 46 per cent in 
2000), with a share in chemicals increasing from 23 per cent in 1980 to 28 per cent in 
2000, and in insurance and finance from 15 per cent in 1980 to 35 per cent in 200020. 
                                                
18 Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, Yearbook, Zurich, 1980/81, 2000/01.  
19 In the Yearbook 1980/81 it was possible to identify the branch for a total of 513 companies, 
in the Yearbook 2000/01 for a total of 490 companies.  
20 Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, Yearbooks 1993/94, 2000/01, 2004/05. 
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Both trends point to an increasing disadvantage of Switzerland as a location for 
production. With regard to services, the traditional advantages in the financial sector 
have rather lost strength for US companies, but Switzerland has become an attractive 
location for US companies in other sectors (see also section 4 below). 
 
The size of the US companies, measured by the number of persons employed in 
Switzerland, was rather small. Table 4 contains some information on the largest 
fifteen firms (*) in the years 1976, 1988, 1993 and 2003. These companies employed 
47 per cent of total employees of US companies in Switzerland in 1976, 34 per cent in 
1988 and around 40 per cent in 1993 and 2003.  
 
Table 4: Largest US Companies in Switzerland by number of employees 
Firms in the manufacturing sector 
Name Employees in CH   Industry Presence 
in CH 
 2003 1993 1988 1976   
Allen-Bradley Co. / Rockwell 
Automation  
840 *1,563 (n.s.) (n.s.) Electrical, electronic 
machinery, etc. 
1956-... 
American Standard Inc. 31 13 90 *760 Oil/gas burners, air brake 
systems, etc. 
before 
1976-… 
Brown & Sharpe (div. of Hexagon 
Metrology) 
300 495 *760 509 Machinery (except electrical) 1966- 
Bulova Corporation (n.s.) 3 6 *900 Watches 1912- 
CPC International Inc.  *1,153 *1,350 *1,367 Food 1970- 
Digital Equipment Corp, (DEC)   *1,850 *1,790 260 Computer 1972- 
Dow Chemical Company *850 *780 *881 515 Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals 1959- 
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. 700 1’000 1’001 *1000 Chemicals, Plastics 1959- 
Eastman Kodak Company  *560 724 *973 Chemicals, Photographic 
Equipment 
1910- 
 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.  (n.s.) (n.s.) 85 *1300 Rubber/Plastics Products 1935- 
General Electric  *980 131 31 105 Electrical, electronic 
machinery, etc. 
before 
1976- 
General Motors Corp.  264 393 469 *522 Transportation Equipment 1935- 
Hewlett-Packard *1,000 *1,050 *900 374 Computer 1958- 
Honeywell Inc.  5 *527 *790 180 Computer 1947- 
IBM *3,400 *2,440 *2,780 *2,537 Computer 1927- 
ITT   55 60 *3,447 Communication 1935- 
Johnson & Johnson (Cilag, other 
Companies) 
*2,010 *803 *774 *591 Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals 1969- 
3M  276 515 514 *710 Paper, Chemicals, 
Measuring Instr., etc. 
1945- 
AEA Investors (Mettler-Toledo)  *1,300 - - - Measuring Instr., etc. 1996- 
NCR Corporation 220 *1688 *1979 *1350 Computer 1918- 
Philip Morris/Altria Group *2,800 *2,544 *1,400 *1,600 Tobacco 1964- 
Procter & Gamble *1,450 323 234 235 Chemicals 1953- 
Sperry / Unisys  330 *700 *910 *1,495 Computer 1925?- 
Total employees 17,656 18,586 17,528 20,730    
Firms of the service sector 
 
     
American Express Bank 45 290 886 250 Banking 1921- 
American Medical International Inc. 
(AMI) 
 (n.s.) *878 (n/a) Health Services; Hospitals 1978- 
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Battelle Memorial Inst. 65 150 200 *610 Business Services 1952- 
Citibank / Citicorp  770 *994 *855 500 Banking 1960- 
Electronic Data Systems (EDS) *1,170 96 (n.s.) - Inform. technology services 1985- 
Ernst & Young *2,400 (n/a) (n.s.) 25 Accounting etc. 1960- 
HCA Healthcare *950 - - - Health Services; Hospitals 2000- 
Hilton International Co. 710 *740 *1,582 340 Hotels 1969- 
McDonald's *7,440 *2,350 *980 - Restaurants 1980- 
NTL (Cablecom)  *1,400 - - - Communication  2000- 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  *2,400 (n/a) 224 88 Accounting etc. 1957- 
Texas Pacific (Bally, Gate Gourmet) *1,620 - - - Holding and Investment 
Companies 
 2000- 
Total employees 18,970 4,620 5,605 1,813    
Sources:  
Employees: Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, Yearbook, Zurich, 2003/04, pp. 52, 94; Yearbook 1993/94, pp. 76,165; Yearbook 
1989/90, pp. 143-222; Yearbook 1988/89, pp. 93, 151; Yearbook 1976, pp. 109-159. Year of foundation: Schweizerisches Ragionenbuch 1976, 
offizieller Firmenführer, Zurich, Orell Füssli. Industry: Yearbook 1976 or if younger 2003. 
 
About a third belonged to the service sector. The firms of the manufacturing sector 
were mainly active in the branches ‘computers and communication’, ‘chemicals’, 
‘instruments, equipments and machinery’. In 1976 only seven and in 2003 only five 
companies were actually producing goods in Switzerland. Most manufacturing 
companies concentrated on sales and other services. Between 1976 and 2003 the 
number of companies with their European or international headquarters in 
Switzerland increased from five to eight.  
 
Of the thirty-five firms listed in Table 4, twenty-eight were established before 1976, 
thirteen even before 1950; twenty-four firms were active throughout the period 1976-
2004 (73 per cent compared with 18 per cent of all companies). Obviously, the largest 
US companies, once located with subsidiaries in Switzerland, tended to stay, even 
when the parent firms changed hands in the course of mergers and acquisitions. But 
also among these largest firms there was considerable up- und downgrading, several 
exits and some new entrants, mainly acquisitions of Swiss companies. If we compare 
the number of entries and exits of all US companies during the two periods 1984-1990 
and 1993-2000, the overall pattern is largely the same, but the number of employees 
in the manufacturing sector remained about the same between 1976 and 2003, while 
the number of employees in the service sector increased considerably, especially since 
1993. By 2003 over 50 per cent of total employees were employed in companies of the 
service sector, compared with about 17 per cent in 1976. This shift of employment 
from the manufacturing to the service sector is even more pronounced for the largest 
companies listed in Table 4 above.  
 
Rather surprising is the result of an analysis of the functions fulfilled by the US 
manufacturing companies, which moved in and out of the country between 1993 and 
2000: According to these figures, Switzerland has become more attractive as a 
location for production (35 entering and 19 exits). This reversed trend must be due to 
acquisitions of Swiss manufacturing firms by US companies. The analysis also reveals 
that Switzerland has become less attractive for European and international 
headquarters: Of the 148 subsidiaries leaving Switzerland 42 had fulfilled the 
functions of European and 11 of international headquarters of US companies, while 
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among the 224 subsidiaries entering into Switzerland only fourteen assumed the 
functions of European and four of international headquarter21. 
 
The ownership structure has been analysed at three benchmark years (1983, 1989, 
2000) based on another source. As had been the case for the earlier period, the large 
majority of companies (in this period between two thirds and three fourth) were 
totally owned by the US parent, and only 6 to 9 per cent were owned at less than 50 
per cent22. 
 
4. Industry and case studies of US companies in Switzerland 
 
In this section, we shall concentrate on sectors where US companies had a competitive 
advantage compared with Swiss firms – the petroleum industry, the automobile and 
the IT & computer industry – and sectors where Swiss firms were highly competitive 
themselves on an international level - chemicals and pharmaceuticals, watches, 
finance and insurance.  Other branches with a considerable number of US companies 
in Switzerland during the last decades of the twentieth century have been 
‘administration & consulting’ and ‘accommodation & food services’ or ‘health care’. 
Well-known US hotel and restaurant chains have established subsidiaries in 
Switzerland. Hilton is listed among the fifteen largest US companies (see Table 4 
above). Outstanding is the rapid expansion of McDonalds, now the company with by 
far the largest number of employees. Initially, the firm encountered strong opposition 
from consumers and competitors, from employees and their unions and also from the 
environmentalists, but McDonalds adapted its business practices to tastes, norms, 
social and environmental standards prevailing in its host environment and protests 
ebbed away23. Rather surprising and difficult to explain is that one of the largest US 
companies in Switzerland already in the 1970s – Philip Morris – has expanded its 
activities and continues to produce cigarettes (see Table 4 above). Switzerland has a 
long history and good reputation as a tobacco manufacturing country, but nowadays 
this reputation is rather related to cigars and not to cigarettes. 
 
A. The US petroleum industry in Switzerland 
 
Compared with other European countries, foreign direct investments in the 
petroleum industry – one of the leading US industries with regard to FDI – were rather 
delayed. US multinationals were present in Switzerland since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, but the first refineries were built only in 1962. The industry was 
completely dominated by foreign firms, leaving little incentives and opportunities for 
domestic firms to enter into the market. Only Migros, the leading Swiss retail chain 
store, has successfully challenged the foreign MNEs by compensating its disadvantage 
as a latecomer with its strong position in the domestic market and continues to 
occupy a share of the market24.  
 
                                                
21 Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, Yearbooks 1993/94 and 2000/01. 
22 Hansjürg Sager (et alii), Who Owns Whom, Der Schweizerische Beteiligungsatlas, Zurich, 
U.Bär Verlag, 1981, 1989. Ulrich Bär (et alii), Who Owns Whom, Der Schweizerische 
Beteiligungsatlas, Zurich, Orell Füssli, 2000. 
23 Romeo Regenass, “Kritiker machten McDonald’s Schweiz stark“, Tages-Anzeiger, 13 April 
2007, p. 27. 
24 Manuel Hiestand, “Der Markteintritt der Migrol – Der Benzinkrieg in der Schweiz Ende 
der Fünfziger-Jahre“, Seminar Paper, University of Zurich, 2003. 
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B. The automobile industry and the case of General Motors in 
Switzerland  
 
By the early 20th century there was quite a remarkable and innovative automobile 
industry in Switzerland, but the firms were unable to adopt mass-production 
techniques and compete with the large foreign firms. The high-quality profile of 
industrial production in Switzerland turned into a disadvantage in those products 
where mass production prevailed. In the Great Depression of the 1930s, some 
communities in the regions most affected from the fall of exports attempted to attract 
FDI in order to procure jobs for the large number of unemployed. When it became 
known that the General Motor Corporation from Detroit wanted to establish an 
assembly plant in Switzerland, several towns offered favourable conditions in order 
to attract this investment25. Biel, a town heavily affected by the crisis in the watch 
industry, offered the most generous conditions, which were supported by all political 
parties and an overwhelming majority of the population although the number of jobs 
that GM promised to create was rather limited.  
 
The reason for establishing an assembly plant in Switzerland was the increase of 
customs duties on finished cars, mainly intended to protect the domestic market for 
trucks. The GM plant in Biel was founded in Mai 1935, production started in 1936, 
and subsequently about 2,000 cars were assembled every year. The plant procured 
jobs for about 300 workers. The large display windows on one side of the assembly 
hall allowed to observe work at the assembly line and fascinated the population not 
used to this kind of manufacturing process. During WW2, the plant was kept going 
with the manufacture of other products. After the war production was rapidly 
expanded. In 1968 the number of employees reached a maximum of 1,400 and the 
number of cars increased to 17,740 per year; GM had become the largest consumer of 
electricity and the largest taxpayer in Biel, but the boom was short-lived. In May 
1975, GM informed the political authorities that the assembly plant was to be closed 
because of inefficiencies. Due to the new customs conventions agreed within the GATT 
the tariff burden on imported finished cars was almost the same as for the 
components: the high customs duty on finished cars had been the main reason for 
establishing an assembly plant in Switzerland in the 1930s, and obviously it was still 
the main reason forty years later. The surprising point is that no other location-
specific or firm-specific advantages had been created during this long period. 
Whether there had been a positive impact on related industries, especially the 
considerable number of Swiss firms supplying components to foreign car 
manufacturers, is unknown. 
 
For the community of Biel the closing of the GM factory was a hard blow because it 
coincided with the general economic depression in Switzerland. With over 500 
employees General Motors was still among the largest US companies in Switzerland 
(see Table 4 above) in 1976, but until 2003 the number of employees declined by half. 
Still, the functions remaining in Switzerland were extended from “sales in 
Switzerland and in Europe” to “European headquarter”.  
 
C. The computer and IT industry and the case of IBM  
 
                                                
25 Tobias Kästli, Das rote Biel 1919-1939, Probleme sozialdemokratischer Gemeindepolitik, 
Bern, Fagus Verlag, 1988.  
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In this branch US companies disposed of a considerable competitive advantage and 
were in a better position to exploit the research capacities and market opportunities 
in Switzerland than any of the domestic firms venturing into this sector. Domestic 
firms were either unable or unwilling to exploit the location-specific endowments, 
mainly the innovative research going on at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
in Zurich, the highly qualified workforce, the considerable strength of domestic firms 
in related areas (such as precision instruments) and highly qualified potential users 
capable of adopting new technologies and used to keep up with technical progress. 
The distribution by industry of the subsidiaries of the largest US MNEs shows that 
‘Industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment’ had an important 
share in the total number of subsidiaries since the beginning of the twentieth century 
(see Table 1). Several of the main US computer and IT companies are listed in Table 4, 
but in 2003 only two of these companies – IBM and Hewlett-Packard – still were 
among the fifteen largest US companies. Both companies have increased the number 
of employees considerably since 1976 and have located international headquarters in 
Switzerland.  
 
The case of IBM in Switzerland is a remarkable success story, with regard to the 
duration of stay in the country, the continuous expansion, the high acceptance by the 
host environment and the activities pursued: a sales and service centre for business 
machines was established already in 1927, but in 1956 IBM founded its first research 
laboratory outside the US in Switzerland near Zurich26. The number of employees in 
the research laboratory increased continuously from 110 in 1976 to 310 in 2003. In 
the case of IBM sales and services, there was a massive reduction of employees in the 
early 1990s, when IBM had to cope with a serious crisis. But the subsidiaries in 
Switzerland were able to successfully defend their position within the IBM group and 
in 2003 the number of employees was higher than in 1990. The high acceptance of 
the firm in its host environment was to a considerable extent due to the strategy of 
internationalisation pursued by IBM. As a rule, the personnel and especially the top 
managers had to be nationals of the host country, and the declared aim of the US 
parent firm was that its subsidiary companies were perceived as national firms in 
each of the host countries. Up to the crisis of IBM in 1992 the strategy of 
internationalisation can be defined as ‘multidomestic’ in contrast to the ‘global’ 
strategy pursued subsequently27. 
 
The positive impact of the strong presence of US firms of the ‘IT & computer’ industry 
on the Swiss economy can hardly be overstated. Notwithstanding the weakness of 
domestic firms in this branch, Switzerland had the second highest density of 
computer applications (after the USA) in the 1970s and 1980s, and in 1991 it was even 
described as having the highest density28. Furthermore, domestic firms were unable 
to compete in the ‘hardware’ of the industry, but specialised in ‘software’ and have 
created a considerable location-specific advantage that recently induced the US 
                                                
26 The IBM research laboratory celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2006. For that occasion, the 
firm has granted access to its archives for research on the history of the IBM companies in 
Switzerland: Pascal Schär, “Die IBM in der Schweiz”, seminar paper, University of Zurich, 
October 2005; Pascal Schär, “Die Internationalisierung von F&E am Beispiel des IBM 
Forschungslaboratorium Rüschlikon”, Diplomarbeit, University of Zurich, 2006.   
27 Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London and Basingstoke, 
Macmillan Press, 1990, pp. 53 ff.  
28 Andy Bantel, “Schweiz hat grösste EDV-Dichte”, Schweizer Handels-Zeitung, 1st May 1991, 
p. 33. 
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company Google to establish its European research and development centre in 
Zurich29. 
 
D. US companies in highly competitive branches of the host country 
 
In this section we shall focus on a case study of a US company in the watch industry, 
where foreign firms have been extremely rare until quite recently, on the chemical 
pharmaceutical industry and on the financial sector.  
 
a. The case of Bulova watches 
 
Since 1887 Joseph Bulova, a Czech immigrant to the USA, imported Swiss watches for 
sale in his shop in New York, which he had established in 1875. In 1911 the firm 
opened offices in Biel, a centre for watch and clock manufacturing in the northwest of 
Switzerland, in order to assure deliveries of watches ‘made in Switzerland’. It started 
manufacturing watches in various workshops in Biel in 1920 and built its first factory 
in 1927. In 1970, Bulova Watch & Co. comprised twenty factories in eight countries, 
of which four in Switzerland (two in Biel, one in Neuchâtel and one in Geneva). Of the 
total of 8,000 employees, 1,700 were employed in Switzerland30. Clearly, the direct 
investment in Switzerland was important for the parent firm and had developed 
successfully during a period of more than forty years. 
 
We suppose that the motives for expanding manufacturing in Switzerland in the 
interwar period were linked with the protectionist policies in the USA and in 
Switzerland. In that period the US market became the main sales outlet for the Swiss 
watch industry. The US watch industry was about half the size of the Swiss one, and 
although it was a small industry in the US context, it was a strong lobbying group for 
import protection. When the US government increased the customs duty for finished 
watches, Bulova and other Swiss producers turned to exporting components, for 
which customs duties were much lower, and assembled the watches in the USA. But 
this practice was understood as a first step towards the ‘expatriation’ of the Swiss 
watch industry: exporting components and also watch-making machinery were 
prohibited. The authorities even introduced measures against the emigration of 
specialised workers, notwithstanding the large number of unemployed. In such a 
context it was feared that the American firm Bulova could put at risk the successful 
implementation of the various protective measures introduced. In effect, official 
sources indicate that there were several investigations based on the suspicion that the 
firm did not adhere to the rules, that it continued to export components to the USA or 
watch-making machinery to its subsidiary company in France.  But it soon also 
became clear that other important Swiss companies made use of their relations with 
Bulova in order to promote exports of watches to the US market. So, the authorities 
were confronted with a mixture of positive and negative effects and, consequently, 
their attitude towards Bulova was rather ambiguous. Thorough measures were not 
undertaken, because important domestic interests could have been damaged. 
                                                
29 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Internet-Suchdienst Google baut Standort in Zürich aus, 18 
January 2007, p. 55. 
30 Christophe Koller, “L’Affaire Bulova Watch et les États-Unis au temps du protectionnisme. 
Stratégie d’entreprise «migrations» de l’industrie horlogère Suisse”, in Hans-Jörg Gilomen, 
Margrit Müller, Béatrice Veyrassat (eds.), Globalisierung – Chancen und Risiken. Die 
Schweiz in der Weltwirtschaft, Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialgeschichte, Band 19, 19. Jg., Zurich, Chronos, 2003, pp. 235-250. 
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The expansion of Bulova in Switzerland continued until 1970, we may assume that a 
major change in the relative costs of producing in or importing from Switzerland 
occurred only in the 1970s. The reason for reducing manufacturing in Switzerland 
may have been the same as those mentioned for GM, namely the liberalisation of 
trade with the GATT agreements, possibly enforced by the crisis of the Swiss watch 
industry in the early 1980s. In the perspective of the US parent firm Switzerland must 
have lost its specific advantage as a location for manufacturing watches. By 1976 the 
number of employees had decreased to 900 (from 1,700 in 1970) and the factories in 
Neuchâtel and Geneva had been closed. The number of employees continued to 
decline, and between 1980 and 1988 manufacturing in Switzerland was given up 
altogether (see Table 4 above). Bulova became the European headquarter for the 
import and export of watches31.   
 
b. Chemicals-pharmaceuticals and the case of Cilag 
 
Chemicals-pharmaceuticals became one of the leading Swiss export industries during 
the interwar period. The industry had an important share of subsidiaries of the 
largest US MNEs since the 1950s (see Table 1 and Table 4 above). Between 1977 and 
1984 the number of US companies increased from over 40 to a maximum of 62, then 
declined to about the same level again by 2002. As has been mentioned above, 
measured with the number of companies the share of this industry declined, but 
employment continued to increase from 3,500 in 1976, to 6,200 in 1984 and almost 
7,400 in 2002. Until 1995 between 35 per cent and 40 per cent of these firms were 
located in the Canton of Zurich, in 2002 this share was still 24 per cent, but the 
proportion of firms located in the Canton of Basle (the main centre of the chemical 
industry in Switzerland) increased from an average of about 6 per cent until 1987 to 
over 12 per cent in 2002, and of those located in the Canton of Zug to about a fifth in 
1990. The other preferred location was the Canton of Geneva with 18 per cent in 1977 
and 12 per cent in 2002.  
 
The size of these firms with regard to the number of employees was rather small – 
only about 10 per cent had more then 250 employees –, but a few of the most well-
known US chemical companies still belong to the largest US companies in Switzerland 
(see Table 4 above). A case study giving interesting insights into the development of a 
Swiss firm acquired by the US company Johnson & Johnson is the history of Cilag. At 
the time of the take-over in 1959 it was a medium-sized, highly specialised and 
innovative company, with subsidiaries in several European countries, but in serious 
financial difficulties. With the acquisition of Cilag, the parent company diversified 
into the new product line pharmaceuticals 32. As a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, 
Cilag continued to prosper at its home base, where it became one of the largest 
industrial firms. After the take-over it had to give up its research activities, but 
maintained a strong position in development and manufacturing, and gradually Cilag 
reassumed an important role as a centre for research and development within the 
group. With hindsight, the integration of Cilag into one of the large US MNEs had very 
positive consequences for its further development. The decentralised governance 
                                                
31 Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, Yearbooks, 1976, 1980/81, 1988/89, 1990/91, 
1993/94, 2004/05 
32 Cilag 1936-2006, Geschichte eines Schaffhauser Pharmaunternehmens, Zurich, Chronos, 
2006. Johnson & Johnson took over 90 per cent of the share capital in 1959 and by 1963 it 
owned 100 per cent. The company history has been written by Hans Ulrich Wipf, a business 
historian, and is carefully documented. 
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structure of Johnson & Johnson granted sufficient freedom of initiative, and Cilag 
exploited its room for manoeuvre successfully: it was able to maintain and expand its 
activities at its home-base, Schaffhausen, as well as in foreign countries and gradually 
assumed tasks for a wider European area within the group.  The history of Cilag also 
shows the positive impact Johnson & Johnson derived from acquiring a much smaller 
foreign firm with different know-how and competencies. In its specialised area Cilag 
had a clear competitive advantage, and this advantage was linked with its home base 
in the sense that it was embedded into the grown structure of the firm and its 
capabilities. It can be understood as a firm-specific endowment that is still bound to 
the location in Switzerland. In the Canton of Schaffhausen Cilag is one of the largest 
firms with more than 1000 employees. 
 
c. US finance and insurance in Switzerland 
 
Switzerland established its position as an international financial centre mainly in the 
second half of the twentieth century and especially since the 1970s. As has been 
mentioned in the third section, the presence of US banks can be traced back to the 
1920s. Two US banks with branch offices in the interwar period – National City Bank 
and American Express – are still present in Switzerland (see Table 4). According to 
the yearbooks of the Association of the foreign banks in Switzerland, out of a total of 
97 banks in 1972 23 were US and Canadian banks, compared with 55 from all 
European and 8 from all Asian countries33. Until 1995 the total number of foreign 
banks reached a maximum of 160. The number of European banks had increased to 
83, the number of Asian banks reached a maximum of 46 in 1993, the number of the 
US and Canadian banks did not change. At the turn of the century, the number of 
foreign banks had increased to 150: 102 from European countries, 13 from Asian 
countries, 25 from the USA and Canada, and 10 from other regions. Between 1972 and 
2000, the share of the US and Canadian banks in total assets of foreign banks was 21 
per cent at the beginning and 18 per cent at the end of the period, while the share of 
the banks from European countries increased from 55 per cent to 75 per cent. With 5 
per cent in 2000, the share of the Asian countries was well below the level of 1972 (10 
per cent), and the maximum reached in 1994 (23 per cent). Based on these figures we 
conclude that Switzerland has been an attractive location for European banks, and 
temporarily for Asian banks, but much less so for US banks. 
 
An analysis based on the yearbooks of the Swiss American Chamber of Commerce 
confirms these results. Between 1976 and 2003 a total of 141 US firms can be assigned 
to the financial sector, of which about 70 per cent can be defined as banks and about 
10 per cent as insurance companies. The banks employed between 80 per cent and 95 
per cent of all employees in the financial sector. Almost 10 per cent of all firms in the 
financial sector (13 banks) were present throughout the period 1976-2004, compared 
with 18 per cent of all US companies. There were quite a large number of entries and 
exits of firms in this branch: 30 new firms compared with 27 exits in the 1980s, 20 
new firms and 33 exits in the 1990s. The share of the financial sector in the total 
number of firms declined from over 11 per cent in 1976 to 7 per cent in 2002. The 
number of the employees in this sector fluctuated similarly to the total number of 
employees in US firms, but the fluctuations were more pronounced. The financial 
sector employed a maximum of 5700 employees between 1982 and 1986, than 
declined to 3,430 in 1995, increased rapidly to 5,600 in 2001 followed by a drop to 
                                                
33 Verband der Auslandbanken in der Schweiz, Jahrbuch 1972-2001. The large majority of 
the Northamerican companies were from the USA. Until 1978 there were no Canadian banks.  
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3,600 employees in the following two years. With an average of 40 employees in the 
late 1970s and 80 employees in 2002, the size of these firms was rather small. Most 
firms employed less than 50 employees. The share of companies with over 250 
employees fluctuated around 5 per cent. The preferred locations were Zurich and 
Geneva (between 80 and 85 per cent) and the canton Ticino (about 10 per cent).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The development of US companies in Switzerland during the twentieth century has 
been analysed at different levels: the available aggregate data on direct investments 
and employment cover a rather short period and diverge to a considerable extent, but 
largely conforms to the broad picture derived from the quantitative analyses of US 
companies with subsidiaries in Switzerland. The available data on the number of US 
parent companies covers the whole twentieth century: According to the number of 
subsidiaries of the largest US MNEs in the early period (1900-1975), Switzerland’s 
position was comparable to that of the Netherlands, but in the years 1929, 1939 and 
1953 the number is lower and subsequently it is somewhat higher (Table 2). We may 
conclude that Switzerland became less attractive as a host country for US companies 
in the interwar period and up to the early 1950s. From then on it has been one of the 
preferred locations for US direct investments Europe.  
 
The distribution of investments by industry and the industry case studies reveal that 
there has been a remarkable accumulation of firms in the IT and computer industry, a 
branch where there was practically no domestic competition. Another industry with a 
relatively large number of companies is chemicals-pharmaceuticals. In this branch, 
Swiss firms have been quite strong, but specialised on particular product lines, 
leaving ample room for US companies with a different specialisation to participate in 
the domestic market. A rather surprising result was the comparatively low 
participation of US companies in the expansion of Switzerland as an international 
financial centre since the 1970s. Large investments were made in the wholesale trade. 
For most US companies of the manufacturing sector, Switzerland has been an 
attractive market for sales, but not for production. There have been exceptions, and 
in some cases they can be related to special causes, for example to the increase of 
customs duties and import quotas in the case of General Motors, to protectionist 
policies in the case of Bulova or to the take-over of Swiss manufacturing firms in the 
case of Cilag. Switzerland has also been able to take advantage of its ‘centrality’ within 
Europe: Several of the largest US companies in Switzerland have established their 
European headquarters in Switzerland, but if the number of new headquarters 
established between 1993 and 2003 is compared with those that disappeared, the 
country seems to have lost some of its advantage in this respect. Being less integrated 
in the European Union may have weakened its competitiveness compared with other 
European countries. 
 
Until quite recently foreign firms have received little attention in Switzerland. Even 
on the local level the impact of US subsidiaries was felt only exceptionally, and these 
firms were seldom contested. This was probably due to the rather small size of the 
firms, to the fact that they were located in a few urban centres of the country and that 
they assumed mainly complementary functions as importers and distributors of 
finished goods in sectors where competition of domestic firms was weak or non-
existent. The rather difficult relationship with Bulova was a special case in a special 
period of time, mainly due to the protectionist policies applied in the watch industry. 
In the same town and same period the presence of GM was highly welcomed. Only 
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exceptionally cultural differences were clearly apparent for quite a large population, 
for example in the case of McDonalds. In this and in other cases it has been possible 
to show that the high acceptance of US companies in their local environment was 
mainly due to the strategy of internationalization pursued by their parent companies, 
leaving ample room for the subsidiaries to adapt to the host environment and become 
or remain in important aspects similar to the domestic firms. The attitude of US 
companies towards their foreign subsidiaries has changed in the 1990s: The large 
MNEs – and not only those of US origin - increasingly adopt a global strategy implying 
that the subsidiaries have less autonomy. This new trend may largely explain the 
considerable repositioning of the largest US companies in Switzerland since the 
1990s. 
 
Switzerland has become an attractive location for US companies of the service sector. 
Their expansion has compensated the declining attractiveness as a location for 
production. But this trend – in the direction of services and away from 
manufacturing – has been somewhat reversed since the middle of the 1990s: since 
then there has been quite a large number of firms engaged in production among the 
newly entering US subsidiaries. Further investigations will be needed to explain this 
phenomenon, but we assume that it is due to a particular type of location-specific 
advantage, namely competitive and innovative Swiss manufacturing firms, which US 
companies relying primarily on their own strength and competitive advantage have – 
with some exceptions – rather neglected as investment opportunities in the past. 
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